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Abstract 
The blanket guarantee introduced in 1998 in response to the emerging banking and 
economic crisis resulted in $50 billion of losses to the general public. The 
government has now introduced a law that enables the phasing out of this blanket 
guarantee, but which also allows for its reinstatement in the event of any threatened 
collapse of the banking system. Rather than eliminating the possibility of any 
repetition of the previous banking disaster, the new law effectively mandates an 
almost identical approach to handling system-wide banking collapses in the future, 
suggesting that the authorities and their advisers learned very little from the recent 
bitter experience. It is argued here that the crucial starting point for formulating 
policy in this field is to correctly specify the exact purpose that government 
intervention is intended to serve: namely, the avoidance of major macroeconomic 
disruption as a result of bank failures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What is the purpose of a guarantee of bank deposits? Deposit guarantee funds began 
to be established by various state governments in the US in the late 1800s and early 
1900s (Thies and Gerlowski 1989). These interventionist schemes were presumably 
motivated by the desire of paternalistic governments to protect their citizens from 
financial calamity in the form of bank failures leading to the loss of their 
accumulated savings. That is, the objective was to protect individuals against the loss 
of their assets. The banks participating in these schemes paid a flat rate premium, 
based on the size of their customers’ deposits, into the guarantee fund, which then 
reimbursed depositors of banks that failed. 
But then, in the 1930s, as a direct consequence of the Great Depression, people saw 
in deposit guarantee funds (or deposit insurance) the possibility of removing runs on 
banks as a source of economic instability. A key feature of the Depression was that 
people lost confidence in the banks and rushed to withdraw their deposits. This 
resulted in a rapid fall in the money supply and a consequent drastic squeeze on the 
economy as banks and other entities tried to sell stocks of goods and other assets 
quickly in order to generate liquidity. The further consequence was a very high level 
of long-lasting unemployment and misery for those who lost their jobs. Deposit 
insurance schemes established around this time were based on the reasoning that if 
deposits were guaranteed, people would have no reason to rush to withdraw 
deposits from banks, even if there were signs that the banks were in danger of 
becoming insolvent. In this manner it would be possible to avoid any sudden 
reduction in the money supply, and thus to avoid any rapid contraction of economic 
activity that might otherwise result from this. Thus the purpose shifted to become 
protecting the national economy against disruption, with the aim of avoiding loss of 
income by individuals potentially put out of work as a result of a severe downturn in 
the business cycle, rather than loss of assets by individuals. In other words, there 
was a switch in the focus of deposit guarantees or deposit insurance from micro- to 
macroeconomic considerations. 
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Years later, in the post-World War II era, the economics profession became 
increasingly uncomfortable with this form of interventionism, and searched around 
for some suitable market failure rationale that could justify it. Such a rationale could 
be found in the concept of ‘asymmetric information’ according to which depositors 
were supposedly unable to monitor the financial condition of banks for themselves, 
so that regulators could feel justified in providing them with (compulsory) insurance 
cover. The regulators could argue that they were simply correcting a market failure 
in the form of the imperfect or inadequate information available to depositors. 
Having decided to provide deposit insurance, this also provided a rationale for even 
more detailed regulation and supervision of banks, so that the regulators would 
have ready access to the information that depositors could not obtain themselves, 
allowing the regulators to push for corrective action on behalf of depositors, and on 
behalf of the deposit insurance institution. 
Economists had long been concerned also, however, about the moral hazard 
problem inherent in guarantees of deposits (as with all forms of insurance). By 
protecting depositors against losses that may be incurred by their banks, the 
discipline that depositors would otherwise impose on banks was greatly weakened, 
thus reducing the disincentive for banks to undertake excessively risky lending and 
increasing their incentive for better management. Of course, the moral hazard 
problem only makes sense if depositors are actually well informed of their banks’ 
activities and condition (in contrast with the asymmetric information view that sees 
them as largely ignorant), and if they act on this knowledge—or fail to act, if their 
deposits are guaranteed. Thus the dominant view came to be that large depositors 
had, or could easily obtain, such knowledge, and that therefore they did not need 
protection: they were big enough and sophisticated enough to be able to inform 
themselves as to whether particular banks were healthy or not. For this reason it was 
considered unnecessary to protect large depositors and, perhaps, that it was 
desirable to keep them exposed to risk; deposit guarantees therefore came to be 
restricted to small deposits. 
This brings us back to the opening question: what is the purpose of guarantees of 
deposits? With the restriction of guarantees to small deposits, the rationalisation of 
the guarantee of bank deposits shifted its focus, perhaps without anybody realising 
it, back to the protection of depositors’ assets rather than protecting the national 
economy from the severe downturns in the business cycle. But, in contrast to the 
guarantee funds that existed a century ago, these days it is only small depositors that 
 4
                                                
are seen as worthy or needful of being protected by this mechanism1 (at least in 
those countries that have a deposit insurance system).2
This meant that deposit guarantees, as a mechanism to guard against bank runs and 
the ensuing economic disturbance, had been seriously compromised. Large 
depositors now found themselves with little or no cover, and so they could be 
expected to run if there was a hint of trouble at their bank. This reality was 
eventually brought home with the failure of Continental Illinois Bank in the US in 
1984 (Sprague 1986: 32). It was this and other similar episodes around the same time 
that generated the idea of ‘too big to fail’. Despite the fact that the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation only insured deposits up to the value of $100,000, when the 
big depositors and other creditors started running away from Continental Illinois, it 
was quickly decided to raise the cover to 100% because the bank was believed to be 
‘too big to fail’. 
The confusion apparent in policy making in relation to deposit guarantees and 
insurance reflects the inherent conflicts between the two basic objectives of such 
arrangements (Table 1). On the one hand, there is the desire to protect depositors; on 
the other, there is the desire to protect the general public. Having chosen to 
guarantee deposits, the choice must then be made whether to protect all, or only 
small, deposits. If all deposits are protected, this creates enormous moral hazard 
problems, significantly increasing the likelihood that there will be widespread bank 
collapses as a result of excessive risk-taking and fraudulent behaviour on the part of 
management.  
Since the government is the ultimate guarantor, such collapses are very likely to 
impose huge budgetary costs, which will have their impact on the general public in 
the form of some combination of higher taxes and reduced provision of government 
services. If it is decided instead to protect only the small deposits, this will leave the 
banking system open to destabilising mass deposit withdrawals if there is any kind 
of shock that threatens the solvency of banks. In such circumstances, large depositors 
that are not covered by the guarantee will be quick to withdraw their funds and then 
shift them to safer havens. This, in turn, may result in considerable disruption to the 
 
1 By far the majority of countries with deposit insurance schemes restrict coverage to ‘small’ 
depositors, though the monetary amount that defines ‘small’ differs very widely (Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al. 2005). 
2 Roughly half of the 182 countries contained in the World Bank’s deposit insurance schemes database 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005) do not have explicit deposit insurance schemes. High income countries 
included in this category include Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
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normal flow of economic activity, with a consequent increase in unemployment and 
decrease in individual incomes. There seems no obvious way entirely to resolve this 
conflict, which seems inherent in deposit guarantee schemes. The new Indonesian 
scheme turns out to be no exception, as we shall see.  
Table 1 Inherent Conflicts in Deposit Guarantees and Insurance 
 Objective I: Protect depositors 
    
Choices all  small  
    
Problems   
 moral hazard yes  
 bank runs  yes 
Damage   
 economy  yes 
 budget yes  
Objective II: Protect Public   
 taxes up/services down yes  
 loss of income/unemployment  yes 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the 
1997–99 banking collapse in Indonesia, which provided the catalyst for the 
introduction of the new legislation discussed here. This is followed by a description 
and evaluation of this legislation, and then by a discussion of alternative approaches 
to promoting a more healthy banking system and handling bank failures. The 
concluding section sets Indonesia’s new deposit guarantee legislation in the context 
of an interpretation of the history of deposit guarantees/insurance. 
INDONESIA’S GREAT BANKING DISASTER OF 1997–99 
The disastrous collapse of Indonesia’s banking system in 1997–99 provides a clear 
illustration of the harm done by having conflicting objectives of banking policy. The 
collapse has been well documented elsewhere (e.g. Enoch et al. 2002; Fane and 
McLeod 2002; Pangestu and Habir 2002; Djiwandono 2004; Frécaut 2004), and may 
be summarised as follows. At the beginning of November 1997 the government 
decided to close 16 small banks. Despite having said on several occasions prior to the 
crisis that it provided no guarantee of bank deposits, it now announced that it would 
guarantee deposits at those banks up to a maximum value of Rp 20 million per 
depositor. The implication was that larger deposits in the remaining banks were not 
 6
guaranteed. Since there was a considerable volume of much larger deposits in the 
banking system—in particular, in private domestic banks—this action resulted in a 
rush of withdrawals from these banks, many of which were widely believed to be in 
poor financial condition. Thus the desire to protect the assets of only small 
depositors immediately came into conflict with the imperative of stabilising the 
economy. 
Moral hazard takes over 
In the face of this enormous rush on the domestic, privately-owned banks, the 
government decided to announce a blanket guarantee of banks’ obligations. Thus the 
system had gone from no guarantee to a guarantee of small deposits to blanket 
coverage of all deposits in the space of less than three months. This created a severe 
moral hazard problem, since depositors now had almost no reason to worry about 
whether their banks were engaging in risky behaviour. On the other hand, in the 
absence of any market discipline from depositors the owners and managers of those 
banks had every reason to take on high risks. Their banks were probably already 
insolvent, since the huge devaluation of the rupiah had made many of their 
borrowers incapable of repaying their loans. They therefore had little or nothing to 
lose, and much to gain—especially when there appeared to be strong prospects for 
huge gains from currency speculation. If they could undertake some successful 
gambles they might recoup their losses, and perhaps even come out in front. 
Alternatively, they could simply involve themselves in fraudulent and other illegal 
behaviour (or increase their involvement), such as making large, inadequately 
secured loans to affiliated entities, without needing to worry about any negative 
response from the market. 
Indeed, several banks, including many very large ones, began to make large new 
loans (in conditions of economic crisis, when great caution would have been far 
more appropriate), mainly to their own affiliates. The borrowers then used these 
loans to speculate against the rupiah or to repay their foreign currency borrowings 
(which is much the same thing, since both actions are motivated by expected 
devaluation of the currency, and both have the same macroeconomic impacts). These 
purchases of foreign currency, directly or indirectly from the central bank (Bank 
Indonesia, BI), caused the banks in question to experience severe liquidity shortages, 
whereupon they turned to BI for assistance. Acting as lender of last resort, BI thus 
found itself supplying both the liquidity needed to be able to make such loans 
(known by its Indonesian acronym BLBI: Bantuan Likwiditas Bank Indonesia), and 
the foreign exchange that the borrowers wanted to buy (Figure 1). An inescapable 
conclusion is that the severity of Indonesia’s crisis had a great deal to do with this 
egregious breakdown in the conduct of macroeconomic (monetary and exchange 
rate) policy. The important question now (to which we shall return) is whether the 
new deposit guarantee arrangements will help to avoid such an outcome in the 
future. To put it differently, was the crisis caused or exacerbated by lack of a formal 
deposit guarantee scheme—or by its introduction? 
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IBRA 
The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency, IBRA, began to be established early in 
1998. Its job was basically to clean up the banking system, and it was given a limited 
period of six years in which to do so. Within a couple of months, some big private 
banks had been closed (Johnson 1998: 47–9). Every remaining bank was subjected to 
a new audit, following which an additional large number were closed. Many others 
that had become insolvent (but to a lesser extent) were taken over by the 
government. These were banks that were perceived as ‘too big to fail’: in other 
words, they were regarded as systemically important, such that their failure would 
have a significant negative impact on the national economy. In some of these cases, 
the original shareholders agreed to make a new capital injection, which was 
permitted provided that they ended up owning at least 20% of the shares of the bank 
in question. For all of the banks that were to be rehabilitated, the government  
Banks become illiquid as  loans drawn down 
BI restores bank liquidity  (BLBI) 
Government announces blanket guarantee, creating a serious moral hazard 
Banks make large Rp loans 
Borrowers purchase FX from BI 
Figure 1 Bank Indonesia Financing of Currency Speculation 
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(sometimes in concert with the original owners) injected sufficient new capital to 
cover past losses and to achieve a capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of at least 4%.3
IBRA now was given four functions: 
1 to manage, and to liquidate the assets of, banks that had been closed (the 
liabilities having been transferred to the various state banks, which were 
compensated either with cash from the central bank or bonds from the government) 
2 to take over the worst category of non-performing loans from the state banks 
and from private banks that had been taken over (in whole or part) by the 
government 
3 to manage and to liquidate assets that had been surrendered by their original 
owners in lieu of repayments in cash of last resort loans from the central bank (BLBI) 
to their banks. 
IBRA’s ultimate task was to recover as much cash as possible from the sale of these 
assets and/or shares in the banks in question. IBRA was eventually closed down 
after six years, as originally intended, even though it had not completed its work. 
Making some allowance for further asset recoveries by the finance ministry after its 
closure, IBRA will have managed to recover about 25% of the cost to the government 
of covering banks’ losses in order to bail out depositors (McLeod 2005a). The net cost 
to the government is of the order of $50 billion, or about 40% of annual GDP (Fane 
and McLeod 2002; Frécaut 2004).4 This cost has been met by the issue of new 
government bonds that are being amortised over a period of around two decades, at 
the expense of some combination of reduced government provision of services to the 
public, reduced spending on infrastructure, and increased taxation. 
This brief outline of how the banking collapse unfolded, how it was handled, and 
how the general public are suffering as a result of the costs incurred by the 
government clearly illustrates the inherent conflict in deposit guarantees as 
summarised in table 1. The government’s initial response to problems in the banking 
sector was to guarantee small deposits in the banks it closed, leaving other 
depositors to draw the implication that deposits in the remaining banks were at best 
guaranteed at the same relatively low level. Large depositors then began to desert 
 
3 CAR is the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets. 
4 Understandably, perhaps, the government of the day chose not to report a budget deficit of the 
order of 40% of GDP, although this is exactly what was implied by the bailout. 
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the private banks in droves, to which the government responded by extending its 
guarantee to cover all deposits. But this generated a moral hazard problem of such 
magnitude that many other banks, including all the large domestic banks, quickly 
became insolvent, in many cases deeply so. The government’s contingent liability 
turned out to be far greater than had been anticipated when the blanket guarantee 
was announced in January 1998. The new law discussed here is the (Megawati) 
government’s, and Bank Indonesia’s, collective response to this financial calamity. 
THE NEW LAW 
At the end of October 1997, in the first of a series of Letters of Intent from the 
government to the IMF, the government committed itself to setting up some kind of 
deposit insurance arrangement during the period of crisis assistance by the IMF 
(GOI 1997). In the event, this program ran its course by the end of 2003 without 
achieving this particular target. Legislation was finally passed in September 2004 to 
set up a Deposit Guarantee Institution (DGI, Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan), thus 
allowing the phasing out of the blanket guarantee (GOI 2004).  
Broad outline 
The DGI will be fully owned by the government, which is to subscribe its initial 
capital of Rp 4–8 trillion.5 It will charge a premium to all banks (for which 
participation is compulsory) at a common rate set initially at 0.2% p.a., based on the 
level of their customers’ deposits.6 (There is scope for differentiation of this premium 
amongst banks in accordance with their perceived riskiness, although the difference 
between the highest and lowest premium may not exceed 1% p.a.) Premium income 
will be used to build up a reserve against future claims on the guarantee. Additional 
income will be earned from the investment of this reserve and the initial capital. 
When, or if, the reserve can be built up to a target level equivalent to 2.5% of total 
deposits, the premium can be adjusted downward so as to maintain reserves at that 
level. The scheme itself will not become operational until 18 months after enactment 
of the law, and it will be a further 18 months again before the limit on the size of 
deposits to be guaranteed falls to its ultimate level of Rp 100 million by way of a 
series of six-monthly reductions of the guarantee cover (table 2). 
 
5 The exact amount within this range is to be determined in consultation with the parliament.  
6 The decision to set the rate at 0.2% appears to have been essentially arbitrary. Such premia vary 
enormously around the world (for example: India and Korea 0.05%; Ecuador 0.65%) (Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. 2005).  
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Table 2 Phased Reduction of Deposit Guarantee Coverage 
Coverage of deposits Period 
100% (existing blanket cover) until March 2006 
Rp 5 billion April–September 2006 
Rp 1 billion October 2006–March 2007 
Rp 100 million from September 2007 
 
The elucidation of the law states that  
the value that is guaranteed is hoped to protect all deposits owned by small 
depositors, who represent the majority of bank customers in Indonesia.7
This turns out to be something of an understatement. Recent data suggest that 
almost all deposits (98.3%) are in amounts of less than Rp 100 million (table 3), so the 
new arrangements will certainly provide full protection for virtually all depositors. 
However, if we focus on value rather than number of deposits, we find that less than 
one third (32.1%) of the total value is accounted for by deposits of less than Rp 100 
million. It would appear, therefore, at least at first glance, that the new arrangements 
will be quite incapable of preventing bank runs, since the large deposits not covered 
by the guarantee comprise over two thirds of the aggregate of all deposits (table 3). 
Recall that these were precisely the circumstances that led to the rush on the banks 
following the initial closures in November 1997, when only small deposits (up to 
Rp 20 million) were guaranteed by the government. 
The rationale for the new law is set out in the preamble to its elucidation, which 
draws heavily on Indonesia’s experience with the drastic collapse of the banking 
system during 1997–99. But the authors could just as well have been talking about 
the US at the time of the Great Depression: 
The stability of the banking industry strongly influences the stability of the 
economy as a whole, as demonstrated by the experience of the monetary and 
banking crisis in Indonesia in 1998…  
Confidence on the part of the general public towards the national banking 
industry is a key to safeguarding its stability, such that a crisis such as this 
 
7 This and other translations of parts of the law and its elucidation are by the author. 
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will not be repeated. This confidence can be achieved through legal certainty 
in the regulation and supervision of banks, together with a guarantee of bank 
deposits to improve the continuity of healthy banking business. The 
continuity of healthy banking business can guarantee the safety of the 
deposits of the banks’ customers...8
Table 3 Size Distribution of Bank Deposits (%) 
Size range Cumulative totals 
Rp million Number Amount 
< 7.5 87.7 5.2 
7.5 - 10 88.3 5.6 
10 - 25 93.4 12.7 
25 - 50 96.3 21.3 
50 - 100 98.3 32.1 
100 - 500 99.8 56.1 
500 - 1,000 99.9 62.3 
1,000 - 5,000 100.0 76.7 
> 5,000 100.0 100.0 
Source: Data kindly supplied by Bank Indonesia 
It is astonishing that the lessons of the recent banking collapse can have been so 
easily forgotten. In particular, the statement that ‘… confidence can be achieved 
through legal certainty in the regulation and supervision of banks, together with a 
guarantee of bank deposits…’ can be seen to be nothing more than wishful thinking 
when interpreted in the light of the data presented in table 3. A guarantee that 
covers only a third of the value of deposits cannot be effective in preventing bank 
runs. Moreover, it is likely to be quite some time before the community will feel 
confident about the regulation and supervision of banks. As Fane has pointed out, 
commentators 
... expressed at least guarded praise for [prudential] controls... [long before the 
crisis, but it] turned out that there had been a chasm between the controls that 
existed on paper and those that were actually implemented... Fane (1998: 299) 
                                                 
8 Note that the logic here is confused. The introduction of moral hazard as a result of deposit 
guarantees is actually likely to harm the health of the banking sector, even though it may protect it 
from disruptive bank runs.  
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Indeed, prudential regulation and supervision seems no more effective now than it 
had been before the crisis, as suggested by various recent banking scandals and 
associated closures (Kenward 2004: 26; Soesastro and Atje 2005:  22–3; McLeod 
2005b: 152).  
The preamble to the law demonstrates at least some awareness of the moral hazard 
problem—especially if the guarantee is very broad—and its implications for the 
government’s budget: 
The blanket guarantee of the banks’ obligations, based on the earlier 
Presidential Instruction,9 was successful in restoring the confidence of the 
public in the banking industry during the monetary and banking crisis. 
Nevertheless this very broad guarantee also burdened the state budget, and 
gave rise to moral hazard on the part of the managers and customers of 
banks. The managers were not given an incentive to manage the banks 
prudently, while the banks’ customers did not pay attention to, or consider 
important, the financial condition of the bank when undertaking transactions 
with it. 
All this is followed up with an optimistic statement about what the law hopes to 
achieve—a further example of wishful thinking that betrays a lack of appreciation 
for the inherent conflict in deposit guarantees as described above: 
This law provides for a guarantee to bank depositors, which it is hoped will 
be able to safeguard the confidence of the public towards the banking 
industry, and to minimise the risk of burdening the state budget or the risk of 
emergence of moral hazard. 
The main text of the law prescribes two functions for the proposed DGI: first, 
guaranteeing bank customers’ deposits (reflecting what has been described above as 
a paternalistic desire to protect depositors); and second, helping to safeguard the 
stability of the monetary and banking system and, on occasion, the economy 
(reflecting the macroeconomic imperative of avoiding, or ameliorating the impact of, 
business cycles). These two functions seem clearly to be regarded as independent of 
each other. In particular, the guarantee of deposits is seen as an end in itself: 
protecting the assets of depositors. Thus the law does not argue that the function of 
 
9 Interestingly, there is no formal, specific reference to this in the list of relevant laws and regulations 
that always precede the text of Indonesian laws. Presumably the reference here is to the presidential 
instruction issued in January 1998, announcing the blanket guarantee. 
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the DGI is to guarantee the safety of the bank customers’ deposits in order that 
depositors will never have any reason to rush to withdraw their funds from banks 
(because of fears about solvency, thus removing the possibility of bank runs as a 
source of an economic instability). The depositor protection rationale is most clearly 
evident in the decision to extend coverage to deposits with the so-called secondary 
banks (bank perkreditan rakyat)—several thousand very small banks, the defining 
characteristic of which is that they are excluded from the national payments system. 
Failure of these banks would pose no threat to the stability of the banking system or 
the economy. 
Operational features 
When small banks fail: an inbuilt bias toward closure 
The mode of operation of the DGI is fairly straightforward in the case of failure of 
small banks that are of little importance individually to the economy. The Bank 
Supervision Institution (BSI, currently the central bank) first does all that it can 
within its own authority and powers to correct the problems of troubled banks. But 
if it has exhausted all avenues open to it without success, it then refers the bank in 
question to the DGI, which then decides whether it will rehabilitate or liquidate it.  
If it is decided to liquidate the bank, the DGI ensures that deposits up to a limit of Rp 
100 million per customer are repaid.10 Repayment of deposits in excess of this limit 
must await the generation of cash during the liquidation process. Larger deposits 
will only be repaid to the extent that the bank’s remaining assets generate sufficient 
revenue for this purpose, after meeting the costs of the DGI. The DGI will not lose 
any of its reserves in such cases, since losses of the bank will be absorbed by others: 
first, the shareholders, and then the large depositors. Rehabilitation, on the other 
hand, requires the DGI to make up the difference between total liabilities (excluding 
shareholders’ funds and subordinated loans) and the going concern value of the 
bank’s assets. 
The choice between liquidation and rehabilitation is to be based on the principle of 
minimising the cost to the DGI. Ignoring expenses incurred during these processes 
(such as legal and auction expenses) for simplicity, the cost under the liquidation 
option is the difference between the value of guaranteed deposits and the liquidation 
value of the bank’s assets. The corresponding cost under the rehabilitation option is 
the difference between the value of all third party liabilities and the going concern 
 
10 Recall, however, that there is a phasing-in period during which larger deposits are guaranteed. 
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value of the bank’s assets, this being the amount that needs to be injected in order to 
restore equity from negative to zero.11 The rehabilitation option will only be chosen, 
therefore, if the bank has a relatively large amount of guaranteed deposits, or if there 
is a large difference between the going concern value and the liquidation value of its 
assets.  
Note that what is good for the finances of the DGI is different from what is good for 
Indonesian society as a whole. The discrepancy between the going concern value 
and the liquidation value of a bank’s assets reflects the cost to society if the bank is 
closed. This cost arises because liquidation necessarily involves the dissipation of 
assets that are specific to the bank in question, and are therefore lost if the bank 
disappears. Nothing in the law reflects this important point. In this respect, the law 
demonstrates that policy makers still do not appreciate this consequence of 
liquidating banks: scores of banks were liquidated during the previous crisis, 
including some very large ones. This necessarily involved the unnecessary wastage 
of considerable investment by the banks in question in intangible assets, not to 
mention the fact that many thousands of bank employees lost their jobs. As the 
writer has noted elsewhere (McLeod 2004: 101–2), this was a consequence of 
establishing criteria for liquidation of banks that focused primarily on their capital 
adequacy ratios (reflecting past performance), rather than on minimising the cost to 
the public of the bank rehabilitation program. 
Table 4 shows a hypothetical example in which the DGI chooses liquidation, given 
that the cost to itself of repaying guaranteed deposits is less than the cost to it of 
covering past losses in order to keep the bank operating. It can be seen that this 
choice involves social waste, since the liquidation value of the bank’s assets is 
considerably less than their going concern value. The new scheme is defective, 
therefore, in so far as it requires the DGI to follow a course of action that is unlikely 
to be in the best interests of society as a whole. 
 
11 Additional capital injections to generate positive capital are an investment, not a cost. 
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Table 4 Choice Between Rehabilitation and Liquidation 
Rehabilitation  Liquidation 
 Rp  Rp 
All liabilities 100 Guaranteed deposits 40 
Going concern value 60 Liquidation value 35 
Cost to DGI 40 Cost to DGI 5 
Social cost of liquidation (going concern value less liquidation value) 25 
 
More complex cases 
The operation of the scheme is quite different, however, in the case of ‘systemically 
important’ banks—that is, banks whose closure is believed would probably have a 
significant negative impact on the economy as a whole.12 The decision as to whether 
a bank is ‘systemically important’ is at the discretion of a coordination committee 
composed of the Minister of Finance and representatives of BI, the BSI, and the DGI 
(presumably, their respective heads or their nominated delegates).13 Once a bank is 
so designated, its closure and liquidation is ruled out. Instead, it is handed over to 
the DGI to be rehabilitated. In this case, the question of claims by depositors against 
the guarantee does not arise, since this can only be as a result of liquidation. 
It follows that depositors—not just small depositors, but all depositors—are safe if 
their funds are placed in ‘systemically important’ banks. In effect, the law actually 
provides a blanket guarantee of all deposits in systemically important banks, despite 
the attempt to create the impression that it seeks only to protect small depositors. 
The writer’s understanding is that there are about fifteen systemically important 
banks, which account for about three quarters of total bank deposits. Thus the new 
law does not only further postpone getting rid of the blanket guarantee, but actually 
makes very little progress in getting rid of it at all—even after the long phasing in 
period. Well in excess of three quarters of the value of all bank deposits will still, 
apparently, enjoy a 100% guarantee from the government. This is not to argue that 
 
12 It is surprising that this crucially important term is not defined in the law. The interpretation given 
here is obtained from a reading of the elucidation of the law. 
13 The law actually states that the committee’s membership is comprised of the minister and ‘BI, the 
BSI and the DGI’. 
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rehabilitation is the wrong option, however. On the contrary: as argued above, this 
option avoids the social cost of unnecessary dissipation of bank-specific assets 
inherent in liquidation. Nevertheless, the severe moral hazard problem generated by 
this approach must be acknowledged, and a way to avoid it must be sought. 
System-wide bank runs 
In certain circumstances we can expect that there will be a rush to withdraw deposits 
from large numbers of banks simultaneously, as occurred in late 1997 and early 1998. 
In such circumstances the law allows the government to change the upper limit on 
the size of guaranteed deposits. Indonesia’s experience in 1998 (and that of many 
other countries that have experienced banking crises: recall the case of Continental 
Illinois  in the US, mentioned earlier) suggests clearly that the government is likely 
to respond to political pressures for bailouts by increasing this limit significantly, 
and quite likely to 100% (Fane 1998: 301). In other words, although the law purports 
to replace the current blanket guarantee, in fact it allows this to be reinstated 
whenever there is a threat to the banking system as a whole. The effect of this would 
be to create a severe moral hazard problem again, even at small banks that are not 
considered systemically important in normal circumstances.  
Implications  
It follows from all of this that although almost all depositors will be covered by the 
guarantee, the law achieves little, if anything, in relation to the important objective of 
minimising the moral hazard problem that is recognised in the legislation itself as a 
principal contributor to the previous banking collapse. Under this new law, and 
notwithstanding its optimistic self-justification, depositors will have little reason to 
impose any form of discipline on systemically important banks (that is, by shifting 
their deposits to other banks that are managed more prudently). Accordingly, the 
managers of these banks will have only weak incentives to avoid making excessively 
risky loans, or to fear the market response that would provide some constraint on 
fraudulent or otherwise illegal behaviour.  
When the DGI rehabilitates a bank, it needs to draw down its guarantee reserves to 
provide the necessary injection of equity to cover the accumulated losses of that 
bank. If the losses are so large as to exhaust these reserves it must then draw on its 
own initial subscribed capital and, if this is still insufficient, it must then turn to the 
government to make up the difference. Recall that the targeted size of DGI reserves 
is 2.5% of total bank deposits. By contrast, the ultimate cost to the government of the 
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late 1990s banking bailout was 136% of total deposits of the banking system in June 
1997, just prior to the crisis!14
As the saying goes: those who fail to learn the lessons of history are destined to 
repeat it. In essence the new scheme almost exactly reflects the approach followed 
during the banking crisis of 1997–99, the main difference being that now there will 
be an institution already in existence ready to perform the functions for which IBRA 
was hurriedly established and given responsibility. Thus, rather than setting up a 
new set of arrangements that would minimise the possibility of the banking system 
again imposing huge costs on the state budget, this new law seems almost 
deliberately designed to encourage a repetition, by creating a huge contingent 
liability for the government.  
RETHINKING THE NEED FOR DEPOSIT GUARANTEES 
The enormous cost of Indonesia’s banking collapse demands that policy makers 
design a set of arrangements that will minimise the likelihood of any similar crisis in 
the future. These arrangements should include two basic components: first, 
measures designed to keep the banking system healthy; and second, measures to 
deal properly with bank failures should they occur nevertheless. The discussion 
above suggests strongly that the DGI legislation is not the appropriate policy 
response. First, it does nothing to improve the health of the banks. On the contrary: it 
moves in precisely the opposite direction, by introducing (or failing to eliminate) a 
serious moral hazard problem. Second, it threatens a repeat of the costly bailouts of 
1997–99 by imposing a contingent liability on the government as large as the sum of 
all liabilities of the banking system—around 44% of GDP.15
Strengthening the banking sector 
As has been argued elsewhere, there are at least two main ways in which the health 
of the banking system can be improved. First, banks can be required to adhere to 
much more stringent CAR requirements, given that it is shareholders’ funds that 
provide the margin of safety for banks’ depositors and other creditors. The higher 
this ratio, the greater the protection for creditors, and the greater the incentive of 
owners to ensure prudent management of the banks. Fane and McLeod (2002: 290–
 
14 According to Fane and McLeod (2002: 288), the net fiscal cost of the bailout was about Rp 384 
trillion, while total bank deposits were only Rp 283 trillion in mid 1997. 
15 This figure is calculated as total bank liabilities (excluding equity) in June 2004, divided by GDP in 
2004. 
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91) suggest that the minimum CAR should be at least 16% (rather than the current 
8%). 
Banks’ owners would inevitably protest such a policy change, arguing that it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, for them to find the additional capital. In reality, all 
that is required is to persuade some current holders of, say, time deposits, to become 
shareholders instead, which can be achieved if the issue price of shares, relative to 
the interest rate on deposits, is sufficiently attractive. Alternatively, the current 
owners could generate the necessary funds by selling off some of their other 
business assets (which would have the desirable consequence of encouraging them 
to concentrate more fully on being bankers). Those that are unwilling or unable to 
follow courses of action such as these will need to shrink their banks’ balance sheets 
over time, or sell their banks to new owners. This would hasten the process of 
consolidation of the banking system into a smaller number of larger banks (which 
the authorities regard as desirable), but nobody should be under any illusion that the 
banking system as a whole would shrivel up and die as a consequence of 
significantly higher capital adequacy requirements.   
A second way to increase the health of the banking system is simply to encourage 
much greater participation by reputable foreign banks. The risks faced by such 
banks are far more highly diversified than those of domestic banks, and their capital 
resources are more than adequate to cover losses they might incur in the relatively 
small Indonesian market. In hindsight, the benefit of such a policy is obvious: the 
Indonesian government lost nothing whatsoever on the foreign and foreign joint 
venture banks during the late 1990s collapse. As a side benefit, the competitive 
stimulus foreign banks would offer to their domestic competitors, and the 
demonstration effect of more sophisticated management approaches to the banking 
business, would help to improve the quality of the banking system as a whole over 
time. 
Dealing with bank failures 
The main concern here, however, is how to deal with bank failures, since this 
eventuality cannot be entirely ruled out. It should be clear from the previous 
discussion that the first step is to clarify the appropriate objective. In the view of the 
writer, there is an important role for governments in trying to minimise the 
potentially severe macroeconomic consequences of bank failures, but there is no 
valid argument for protection of the value of bank deposits as an end in itself. Bank 
deposits are only one of a wide variety of forms in which the public can hold its 
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wealth, and it is not sensible for the state to take over the responsibility for carefully 
managing this particular component.  
In different context, there is a strong rationale for caveat emptor (let the buyer 
beware): it is simply not practicable for the state to look after all of our interests in a 
direct fashion when we are buying things. The best it can do is to provide indirect 
protection in the form of a legal environment in which buyers are able to hold 
suppliers to their promises. The same caveat emptor approach is equally sensible in 
relation to investment transactions: it is not practicable for the state to take on the 
role of looking after all of our interests in a direct fashion when we purchase assets. 
Thus nobody suggests that governments should intervene to protect the owners of 
business enterprises, shares, bonds, housing and other real estate, motor vehicles, 
consumer durables or gold against losses in value of these assets. It seems 
inconsistent, therefore, for governments to take on the responsibility of insuring 
individuals and organisations against the loss of value of a particular class of assets: 
namely, bank deposits.16  
Moreover, it is not sensible for governments to go beyond providing an appropriate 
legal framework for protecting the general public by intervening in particular asset 
markets in ways that take away individual responsibility for monitoring and 
managing the risks involved. To do so is to create moral hazard, which implies the 
likelihood of unintended transfers of wealth from the general public to that segment 
of the general public that chooses to invest in the particular asset class on which the 
government chooses to focus. Moreover, this is potentially a regressive policy—
especially in a country like Indonesia, in which bank deposits, broadly speaking, are 
owned by the middle and wealthy classes, but not by the very poor. 
There is at least one argument running counter to these views that is worthy of 
consideration. This is the belief that economic development is assisted by a strong 
financial sector, and that this can be encouraged by having deposit insurance. In 
response to this, note first an important empirical issue yet to be settled: it is not 
clear that financial development causes economic development, or whether the 
causation runs in the opposite direction, or whether the causation runs both ways 
(Manning 2003). More important, however, is that even if it could be shown that 
 
16 The government’s concern to protect depositors against losses incurred as a result of holding 
commercial bank liabilities is not matched by a similar concern about those resulting from their 
holdings of a liability of the central bank: namely, cash. The authorities have a rather sorry record in 
this regard. For example, the value of cash fell by half in the first nine months of the recent crisis as a 
result of poor monetary policy. 
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financial development causes economic development, this does not necessarily 
imply that encouraging financial development by artificial means—such as 
disguised subsidies in the form of government guarantees of bank deposits—is 
called for. The minimum requirement for this to be true is evidence that the rate of 
financial development is slower than optimal. The writer is unaware of any such 
evidence in Indonesia. 
Such subsidies distort the structure of financial markets. It is no coincidence that 
bank finance has played a predominant role in financing investment in Indonesia at 
the expense of other financial technologies for channelling savings to investment, 
such as profit retention and the issue of shares and bonds in the capital market. The 
widely perceived government guarantee of bank deposits, and the important role 
played by state-owned banks for which the profit motive has been relatively 
unimportant,17 have certainly made a strong contribution to this dominance—
arguably, stronger than would have been optimal. Indonesia’s crisis would not have 
been so severe were it not for the artificially expanded role of the banking system. In 
short, the better policy approach for the future will involve reducing or eliminating 
distortions that favour banking over other financial technologies, not maintaining or 
strengthening these distortions. 
Elsewhere, the writer has proposed an approach to dealing with bank failures that 
implicitly accepts the view that protection of the value of bank deposits through 
guarantee/insurance schemes should not be seen as an appropriate objective of 
government policy but that, rather, the objective should be to minimise potential 
macroeconomic disturbance (McLeod 2004).  In broad terms, this approach relies 
heavily on the market processes set in train when firms become insolvent, but 
focuses on accelerating those processes.   
In ‘normal’ insolvencies, claims by creditors of the insolvent firm are typically put on 
hold until its future can be determined.  At that point, creditors effectively become 
shareholders in the firm, and they share in the residual value of its assets (whether it 
is rehabilitated or liquidated). In the present context, the key aspect of the process is 
the long time lag from the moment an administrator is appointed to the insolvent 
firm until all financial issues are resolved. This is of crucial importance in the case of 
insolvent banks, since it is precisely the loss of liquidity on the part of banks’ 
 
17 State-owned banks in Indonesia have a collectively miserable record of failing and being 
recapitalised by the government, at tremendous cost to the public. They have played a far greater role 
in the economy than would have been possible if they had been subject to the unforgiving discipline 
of the market. 
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creditors (especially their depositors) that generates the negative shock to the 
economy—which we wish to avoid.  The proposed solution to this problem is for the 
bank supervision agency to appoint an administrator at the first sign of insolvency 
or even illiquidity on the part of the bank, and then immediately to impose a debt-
equity swap on all creditors to build up the capital of the bank sufficiently to attain 
the regulated minimum CAR.  The size of this swap is based on a very rapidly 
undertaken, and conservative, audit of the bank’s financial condition. 
By this means, the bank is returned to good health (in the sense of meeting the 
minimal capital requirements) within just a few days, after which depositors have 
access to what remains of their deposits.  They have also become shareholders in the 
bank, and are now free to sell their shares if they wish to generate additional 
liquidity.  Since it is lack of access to demand deposits that provides the greatest 
threat to continuity of economic activity, it would be possible to treat the owners of 
such deposits as higher ranking creditors of the bank, such that the debt-equity swap 
could be restricted to the owners of time and savings deposits (assuming the total of 
these deposits is sufficient to cover the accumulated losses of the bank). 
In short, once we set aside the ill considered notion that governments should protect 
the value of bank deposits, it is not difficult to design a set of arrangements for 
dealing with bank failures in such a way that macroeconomic disruption is 
minimised, and regressive transfers of wealth from the general public (especially the 
relatively poor who own very little amounts of bank deposits, if any) to bank 
depositors are avoided. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON MARKETS AND INTERVENTIONISM 
The original guarantee funds of the late 1880s and early 1990s were described above 
as interventionist schemes introduced by paternalistic governments. If depositors 
had desired such guarantees sufficiently strongly to cover the cost of providing 
them, the market would have satisfied this demand, just as it satisfies the demand 
for insurance of houses and cars, for example. There is always a danger—indeed, it 
would seem inevitable—that when a demand for services is met through the 
political mechanism rather than through the market, the costs of provision will 
exceed the perceived benefits, so that some of the cost will need to be met by the 
general public rather than the recipients of the services in question. Thus the market 
processes that would otherwise ensure that roughly the optimal quantity of 
resources is devoted to these services is lost. 
It is not surprising then that the record of the original deposit guarantee funds is 
largely a record of failure. Participation in some of these funds was voluntary, so 
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banks that felt they were prudently managed, and that were able to assure their 
depositors of this, chose to stay outside the funds, thus avoiding paying the 
insurance premium (which they would otherwise have had to pass on to their 
depositors and borrowers). In turn, this meant that the funds found themselves 
covering the less prudently managed banks with a higher probability of failure. To 
the extent they increased the premium to match the risks they were covering the 
problem was exacerbated by adverse selection: more and more of the better 
managed banks left, leaving the funds covering a more and more risky portfolio. 
Eventually, many of these funds failed.  
Perhaps to try to avoid this fate many of the guarantee funds were made 
compulsory. But when banks are obliged to pay for cover, it becomes rather difficult, 
politically, to allow the guaranteeing institution to set different insurance rates 
across banks (as they would if they were providing genuine, voluntarily purchased 
insurance) based on the perceived riskiness of each. Any attempt to impose 
relatively high premia on more risky banks would result in political pressure—such 
as complaints of ‘unfair’ treatment—to secure reductions.18 Thus the funds tended, 
or were required, to use the same rate for all banks, which meant that the natural 
tendency of genuine insurance schemes to penalise excessive risk-taking, and thus to 
reduce risk overall, was lost. On the contrary, risky behaviour was now being 
subsidised at the expense of more prudently managed banks, with the inevitable 
consequence that all banks tended to be managed in a more risky manner. 
All of this may be interpreted as evidence that the strength of demand for deposit 
guarantees had been overestimated, relative to the cost of their provision, by the 
well-meaning governments in question. This is simply another illustration of the fact 
that governments are not very good at picking winners: in other words, the private 
sector is almost always better at perceiving genuine opportunities for making 
profits. It further reinforces the earlier argument that the Indonesian government has 
erred by taking on the role of guarantor of bank deposits. What is needed, rather, is 
for it to focus on the genuinely important issue: macroeconomic destabilisation as a 
consequence of bank failures. This deeply flawed deposit guarantee legislation fails 
to provide an appropriate solution. 
 
18 Presumably it is for this reason that the new Indonesian legislation initially imposes a common 
guarantee premium for all banks, and restricts any future gap between the highest and lowest 
premium to just 1% p.a. 
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